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Total war requires the systematic assignment of a nation's resources to assure that
every item is fully utilized. In terms of manpower each individual must be fitted
into the place where he or she can contribute the most. This means that some
persons must be assigned to military duty. But not every person qualified for military
duty should be permitted to join the service. Some individuals because of their train-
ing and experience can serve best in industry and other activities necessary for the
support of the war effort.
From an industrial standpoint the requirements of war are the concentration on
supplying those things needed for prosecuting the war and supporting civilian life,
and the elimination wherever indicated of all nonessential production and services
(nonessential measured in terms of contribution to the war effort). Industry can
readily use many persons not suited for military service, including a majority of the
persons rejected by the army on physical grounds, in addition to women, youths, and
"over-aged" workers both skilled and unskilled. But, these workers cannot make the
needed planes, tanks, ships, guns, and equipment, except with the guidance and
assistance of engineers, supervisors, and skilled craftsmen. Some of the men in these
trades and professions are also needed in the army. Indeed it is frequently pointed
out that a modern army in some respects resembles a gigantic mobile factory. There
are ground crews, repair crews for tanks and ships, in addition to signal and engineer-
ing corps, and other specialized units. In many cases, however, the skills required by
these specialized units are basic skills adjusted to meet a special situation-ability to
perform under combat conditions. Even skilled workers taken from industry gen-
erally have to undergo considerable retraining. It would seem, therefore, that military
needs for skilled workers should be met as far as possible by training unskilled
workers, especially since the complete control over the individuals to be trained
provides an opportunity to reduce training time to a minimum.
Under present circumstances, the armed forces and industry directly compete in
the recruitment of manpower. The Selective Training and Service Act' renders all
men from 20 to 45 years of age liable to military service. Deferment is provided for
certain government officials, ministers, and ministerial students, and men who are
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physically, mentally or morally deficient or defective. In addition, deferment may be
granted to men on grounds of dependency and occupational status.
The provisions for occupational deferment can best be understood in light of the
deferment experience in the First World War. At that time the acute need for
shipping facilities led to the deferment of all shipyard workers. Occupational and
worker analysis was in only an elementary stage, and in the deferment of shipyard
workers the authorities failed to take into account the fact that many of the workers
thus deferred could have been replaced by workers not liable or acceptable for
military service. As a consequence, many skilled and unskilled workers alike found
themselves engaged in lucrative work in a "sheltered" industry, while many other
workers, better qualified occupationally, were inducted into the army. Resentment
was expressed in an avalanche of criticism of the operation of the Selective Service
System. It was with vivid recollection of this experience that the Selective Training
and Service Act was drafted in i94o.
The Act permits the deferment of men engaged in activities necessary to the
maintenance of national health, safety or interest.2 This general provision is hedged
in by another provision which specifically forbids deferment from military service
except on the basis of the status of each individual.3 No deferment can be made of
individuals by occupational groups or by group in any plant or institution.
The responsibility for determining whether or not a registrant is engaged in an
activity necessary to the maintenance of national health, safety, or interest and there-
fore eligible for deferment is left to the local board in the first instance. For the
guidance of the local board the Director of the Selective Service has ruled 4 that a
registrant should be considered for occupational deferment only if:
i. He is engaged in an activity necessary to war production, or an activity essential to
the support of the war effort, or would be so engaged but for a seasonal or tem-
porary interruption;
2. He cannot be replaced because of a shortage of persons with his qualifications or
skill in such activity;
3. His removal would cause a serious loss of effectiveness in such activity.
When the Selective Service System began to operate late in i94o fear was ex-
pressed in some quarters that it might result in skilled workers needed for war
production being drawn off into military service. At the time, however, there was
still considerable unemployment and industry was not generally converted to war
production. Moreover, only a limited number of men-less than a million-were to
be inducted in the army annually and these for only one year of training. Although
the law was subsequently amended to permit keeping the men in the army for a
longer period of time,5 those 28 years of age and over began to be mustered out in
the Fall of 1941. In this connection, special employment offices were established in
2 Id. §5(e), 54 STAr. 887, 50 U. S. C. §305(e). 3ibid.
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the larger army camps for directing skilled workers among the discharged soldiers
to employment in war production.
With the declaration of war and the tremendous expansion of war production,
the unnecessary loss of highly skilled workers to military service became a serious
matter. No longer are men being selected for limited military training. They are
being selected for the duration. The number to be inducted in the army cannot be
measured in hundreds of thousands. Now it is an undetermined number of millions.
At the same time industry is being generally converted to war production and
new facilities rushed to completion. The test of whether or not a particular skilled
worker can be replaced is an inadequate safeguard against the loss of workers neces-
sary for war production.
There is still a great deal of labor turnover, and in a substantial number of cases
an individual worker can be replaced. However, many employers engaged in essen-
tial production have protested that the local Selective Service Boards have failed to
defer key employees. This is probably because the expanding demands of war pro-
duction are such that both the inductee and the man or woman recruited to replace
him are needed.
The problems of allocating manpower are being constantly reviewed and some
modifications in recruiting practices have been recently effected. Among other things
the War Manpower Commission has been established0 to formulate plans and pro-
grams and establish national policies for the most effective mobilization of our
manpower. One of the first acts of the Commission was to order the United States
Employment Service to prepare a list of essential activities and a list of essential
occupations. The activities list will include (i) essential war activities, (2) activities
required for the maintenance of war activities, and (3) activities essential to the
maintenance of national safety, health, and interest. When the list is completed, it
will contain six or seven hundred industries and segments of industries, covering
the whole range of activities connected with war production and services. The occu-
pational list will include occupations, crafts, trades or skills, or professions required
in an essential activity in which an individual is unable to attain reasonable pro-
ficiency within less than six months of training or experience. It is estimated that
this list will include 3,00o skilled and semi-skilled occupations, from airplane assem-
blers and mechanics to machinists, toolmakers and yard-masters.
The War Manpower Commission also requested the Director of the Selective
Service to supply all local boards with copies of the lists of essential activities and
occupations; and to instruct local boards that, to the extent required for the main-
tenance of essential activities, they are (i) to defer workers from military service,
and (2) to allow qualified workers to establish grounds for deferment by permitting
them to transfer to war production if they are not already employed in war industries.
Without waiting for the United States Employment Service to complete the lists
of activities and occupations, the Selective Service has proceeded to translate the War
'Exec. Order No. 9139, April x8, 1942, 7 FED. REo. 2919.
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Manpower Commission policy into instructions to local boards. If a local board is in
doubt whether a registrant is engaged in an essential activity and can be replaced if
inducted into the army, the local board is supposed to check with the Employment
Service. If a replacement cannot be found, the local board is supposed to give due
consideration to the report of the Employment Service in deciding whether the
registrant should be inducted into the army or continue in the essential activity in
which he is engaged.
In case of a registrant qualified in an essential occupation and not engaged in an
essential activity, the local board is supposed to refer such registrant to the Employ-
ment Service for interview. The local employment office may be allowed 30 days in
which to place the registrant in an essential activity, so as to utilize the occupational
skill possessed by the registrant. If a transfer is effected, the local board is to give
due consideration to the change in the occupational status of the registrant in com-
pleting the classification. If such a transfer of worker cannot be effected within the
time allowed, the classification may be completed and the registrant inducted into the
armed forces. The delay in classification of registrants will in some cases avoid the
induction into the armed forces of qualified workers needed in war production, who
happen to be otherwise engaged at the time they are classified.
While this new policy constitutes a significant advance in manpower allocation,
the procedure is by no means perfect. Maybe enough occupational deferments have
been granted. To date they amount to roughly 4%l of the i8,oooooo men included in
the first and second registrations. One thing seems certain, however, if we are to
recruit an 8- to io-million-man army: there have been too many deferments for
physical defects. Such deferments have been running from 40 to 50% of all regis-
trants reporting for physical examinations. Such a high percentage of rejects on
physical grounds might be justified if the size of the army were to be only 3 or 4
million men. There can be no justification, however, for insisting on physical per-
fection when it becomes necessary to take as many as 20% of the entire eligible group.
With an army of, say, 8 million men it is highly unlikely that the entire force will
ever see combat duty. Many persons with physical defects can be used to perform
non-combatant duties. The recently announced policy of the Army of accepting men
who are not physically perfect should relieve some of the pressure on local boards
trying to meet quotas based on the number of persons registered and qualified for
military duty. Insofar as the pressure on local boards is relieved there will be more
opportunity to defer skilled workers needed in industry.
When it comes to maintaining anachronistic recruiting requirements, industry has
also been at fault. Employers have been slow to abandon the high requirements to
which they became accustomed when they could pick and choose in a surplus labor
market, and have refused to employ women and members of minority groups. In a
tight labor market such as exists today, and under circumstances in which our total
manpower is needed, employers will have to use skilled workers efficiently and
sparingly and train a substantial proportion of their labor force.
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In order to conserve the existing supply of skilled and semi-skilled workers, less
emphasis should be placed upon the immediate replaceability of an individual regis-
trant about to be inducted into the military forces. In determining whether the
available supply is large enough to permit the induction of a registrant in an essen-
tial activity, not only present demands for such workers should be taken into account,
but also the demands that will develop in the next 6 to 12 months. In many occupa-
tions this latter demand will more than absorb the current supply of workers who
may be unemployed or employed in nonessential activities.
The deferment policy should also take into account the difference in training time
required for reasonably proficient performance in the various essential occupations.
A registrant engaged in an essential occupation requiring 6 months to one year of
training or experience should ordinarily be deferred for 3 months. A registrant
engaged in an essential occupation requiring one year or more of training or experi-
ence should ordinarily be deferred for 6 months. At the end of the period the
registrant's case should be re-examined in light of the new requirements of the armed
forces and of industry to determine whether or not the deferment should be extended.
Such a deferment should be granted not as a privilege to the registrant or to his
employer, but in the interest of the war effort, which cannot afford any interruption
of production. Except for the difficulties arising out of the quota system whereby
local boards are under terrific pressure to supply men for the Army regardless of the
circumstances, the deferments suggested here could in most cases be made without
interfering with the induction of a sufficient number of men to meet tie goals
established by the military authorities.
With the assurance of uninterrupted production the deferment policy could be
adjusted from time to time to take into account the relative needs for a larger army
or increased production. When these adjustments are made, some of the men who
may have been previously deferred because of their employment in essential occupa-
tions may have to be inducted into the army. Accordingly, it is imperative that
employers proceed immediately to train replacements for men deferred on occupa-
tional grounds. For occupations requiring from 6 months to one year of training
or experience, it will be possible in many cases to train replacements in a much
shorter period of time through upgrading of workers with some experience. For
occupations requiring more than one year of training or experience, the training of
replacements will frequently be more difficult and will, in some cases, be virtually
impossible. In all cases, however, the employer should be put on notice that the
necessary training should be undertaken at once. At the same time the United States
Employment Service should be notified, since it is responsible for assisting the
employer in recruitment of trainees and for making recommendations to the public
authorities as to the need for training courses.
There are two aspects to the problem of allocating manpower among civilian
activities necessary for the prosecution of the war. One is the geographic distribution
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of the workers, and the other is the allocation of workers among industries and
individual plants within the industries engaged in war production.
The first orders for war materials were placed in established industrial communi-
ties. Here were located plants and facilities, managerial abilities, and labor supply.
At first war production was frequently piled on top of existing production of con-
sumer goods. The Army and Navy, accustomed to peace-time procurement methods
and acting under the administrative policy of "guns and butter" enunciated in i94o,
simply funneled 194 o and early 1941 contracts into their customary suppliers. Thus
the arms and precision instrument industries of Bridgeport and Hartford, the aircraft
industry of Southern California, and the automobile industry of Southern Michigan
soon found themselves with backlogs of war contracts amounting to several years
of normal production. As a matter of fact the increase in the employment and earn-
ings of workers resulted in an increase in the production of consumer goods at the
same time that war production was getting under way. A point was reached, how-
ever, when there occurred serious competition for available facilities and labor
between the production of consumers goods and the production of goods needed
for war purposes. There were not enough to meet all demands and critical materials
had to be rationed. Thus the price of continued operations for many plants was their
conversion to war production. The labor force of the converted plants was frequently
transferred to war production without any severance in the employer-employee rela-
tionships. Oftentimes these conversions called for ingenious worker and job analyses,
coupled with brief but intensive training. The story of the shift of the automobile
industry is well known. The Servel refrigerator plant uses its labor in manufacturing
airplane frames. Cast iron foundries made idle by curtailment orders are now busy
producing aluminum castings, using their old, now retrained, labor. Workers in
other plants that could not be converted transferred to plants engaged in war produc-
tion located within the same community or elsewhere. Thus silk stocking operatives
in Philadelphia, after receiving brief training, went to work for the Quartermaster's
Depot as sewing machine operators turning out a variety of army wares.
At the same time these developments were taking place, new plants and facilities
were being built principally in established industrial communities, usually so that
management and skilled labor could be shared by the old and new plants. Gradually,
however, new areas were affected and some communities which had been depressed
by the cessation of civilian production were turned into "boom" towns almost over
night. Evansville, Indiana, passed from a distressed community to a labor shortage
area as its plant facilities, such as Briggs Body, Servel and Chrysler, were filled with
war work and as new plants, such as the new Republic Aviation plant, were con-
structed for expanding war production. Stimulated by strategic considerations,
together with the incapacity of established industrial communities to accommodate a
further expansion, rural and semi-rural areas were chosen as sites for the location of
new plants and facilities. The open country was particularly sought for the construc-
tibn of armament plants and depots, such as those at Huntsville, Alabama, Charles-
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town, Indiana, and Ravenna, Ohio. Too, the availability of power, transportation,
and other elements of production dictated the location of many plants in places with
little local labor, such as Listerhill, Alabama, and Freeport, Texas.
Two sets of forces were operating to affect the allocation of manpower. In one
case the existence of both a labor supply and production facilities determined the
letting of contracts and the expansion of productive capacity, with the result that the
labor was not shifted geographically, except insofar as it is necessary to supplement
the local supply by in-migration. In the other case labor supply had to be shifted to
new communities to man the plants and facilities which were built in nonindustrial
areas.
The allocation of workers among different industries and plants is conditioned by
strategic considerations, which in turn are affected by the fortunes of war. Workers
should be assigned in accordance with the urgency of the need in the prosecution of
the war for the different products being turned out. At one time the need for ships
may be more urgent than the need for any other implement of war. The demands
of the shipyards for workers in essential occupations may then outrank the demand
of any other industry for the same workers. At another time it may be four-motored
bombers that have priority over the next most urgent need; at another, tanks, guns,
munitions, or other products. To render the problem of allocating manpower more
complicated, the different stages of production of the various plants turning out war
supplies have to be taken into account. Some plants may be operating at near
capacity, while others may be in merely the tooling-up stage. Both plants may be in
need of the same workers, say, machinists or toolmakers, of whom there is an insuffi-
cient supply. In such cases the assignment of the workers may involve the weighing
of the value to the war program of a few additional units of products immediately
against the value of a larger potential supply in the future.
In January of this year the Employment Service adopted a policy of referring
available workers to war producers in accordance with the importance of their
production. For want of a better criterion the material or equipment priority rating
of employers was used to classify them in the order in which they would be supplied
workers. For this purpose the third symbol of the priority rating was ignored and all
employers with a material or equipment rating of A-i to A-io were deemed to be
engaged in war production. Because the supply of workers available through the
Employment Service was inadequate to meet the demands of all A-i employers, wide
latitude was allowed to the local employment offices in deciding which employers
were to have such workers as could be recruited in shortage occupations.
In actual practice the effort of the Employment Service to assign workers to war
employers in accordance with the importance of their production has not been very
effective. Employers are not obliged to use the Employment Service and many
important employers continue to use their own devices for recruiting workers. Em-
ployers with low ratings have had no incentive to use the Employment Service, since
they have not been eligible to obtain workers in shortage occupations in which the
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supply has been insufficient to meet the demands of employers with higher ratings.
Similarly, in some occupations the workers have been long accustomed to obtaining
employment through other channels and never come to the Employment Service to
be referred to a job. One result of the Employment Service assigning workers
according to the importance of employers in the war program has been to focus
greater attention on the existence and character of the labor supply problems.
Recently another approach has been taken in an attempt to solve the problem of
redistributing essential skilled and semi-skilled workers. In collaboration with the
Selective Service System and through its organization, the Employment Service is
taking an occupational inventory of all men registered by the Selective Service Sys-
tem. A questionnaire designed to obtain a record of the occupational training and
experience of each individual is being obtained and turned over to the local employ-
ment offices. These questionnaires are being classified and each person not now
employed in war production, who indicates having had experience in an essential
occupation, is called in for interview. If the individual is qualified in an essential
occupation, he is given an opportunity to transfer to war production where his
services are needed.
The employment offices are attempting to transfer qualified workers to employers
in accordance with the relative importance of their production to the war effort.
Except for general guidance the local employment offices are obliged to use their own
judgment in determining which employers are the most important. The War Man-
power Commission, however, has recently requested the War Production Board to
rate all establishments in accordance with the position they occupy in the war produc-
tion program. When these ratings are available they will provide the Employment
Service with a more satisfactory guide for the recruitment and allocation of workers.
It must be apparent from the foregoing that we have not yet developed an in-
tegrated program of manpower allocation. In absence of any declared policy, the
different agencies concerned have wrestled with the problem as best they could.
There is no compulsion on anyone to work at any particular job. Many experienced
men needed in war production have not yet found their way into essential activities.
Many other workers have moved aimlessly from job to job or in response to oppor-
tunities to obtain higher wages or to enjoy better working conditions. Similarly
employers have been free of control over their employment practices. Competitive
advertising and labor scouting have been engaged in extensively. The absence of
direct authority to control the actions of either the workers or the employers con-
stitute the crux of the yet unsolved manpower allocation problem. At the moment
every possible alternative solution to the manpower problem, short of special labor
market controls, is being considered, with full consciousness that such controls would
inevitably limit the freedom of action of workers and employers alike.
